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THE ACTION OF INDEBITATUS (GENERAL) ASSUMPSITAT COMMON LAW, UNDER MODERN CODES, PRACTICE
ACTS AND RULES OF COURT (Continued)
ALISON REFPY*

175
VI. THE COMMON COUNTS
BROWN'"h states that "the Common Counts were not formerly in
use, and Lord Holt used to say that he was a bold man who first
ventured on them, though they are now every day's experience."
In General
IN Indebitatus or General Assumpsit the action is based, not on
an express or special promise, but on a promise implied by law
from the e.istence of a duty to pay money, arising either from a
debt created by a simple, executed contract or from an obligation
raised by quasi-contract. Like Debt, for which it was a substitute
in certain areas, it specifically enforces the unconditional duty to pay
money. Indebitatus or General Assumpsit lies upon a debt arising
from the passage of a quid pro quo from the plaintiff to the defendant, upon a debt arising from contracts implied in fact, and
which has been executed, leaving nothing to be done but pay the
debt, and upon a debt arising from a contract implied in law, and
known as constructive or quasi-contracts.
And, in setting forth his declaration, the pleader need not indicate which variety of implied contract - in fact or in law- he
*Dean and Professor of Law, New York Law School.
175. In general, on the common counts in Indebitatus or General Assumpsit, see:
Treatises: Chitty, A Treatise on Pleading, The Common Counts, 27-83 (3d Am. Ed.
by Dunlap, Philadelphia 1819); Evans, Essay en the Action for Money Had and Received on the Law of Assurances, and on Bills and "Notes (London 1802); Fifoot, History
and Sources of the Common Law, c. 15, The Subsequent Development of Assumpsit, D.
The Common Counts, 368-371 (London 1949); Martin, Civil Procedure at Common Law,
Appendix, Note 1, General Assumpsit for Part Performance of Express Contracts (St.
Paul 1905); Pomeroy, Code Remedies, c. III §§ 443-449 (4th Ed. by Bogle, Boston
1904); Shipman, Handbook of Common Law Pleading, c. VIII, Action of Assumpsit
(Special and General), §§ 59-60, General Assumpsit or the Common Counts, 154, (3d
Ea. by Ballantine, St. Paul 1923).
Articles: Ames, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation, 3 Selected Essays in AngloAmerican Legal History, Pt. VI, Contract, 299 (Boston 1909); Beals, Recovery for Work
Not According to Contract, 19 Yale L. J. 669 (1910); King, The Use of the Common
Counts in California, 14 So. Calif. L. Rev. 288 ,1941).
Comments: Pleading: Sufficiency of the Common Counts, 4 Calif. L. Rev. 352
(1916); Quasi-Contract-Assumpsit for Use and Occupation Against a Trespasser in
Modern Cases, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1087 (1932); Common Counts in Assumpsit Followed
by Allegations of Promise to Pay, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 756 (1937).
Annotations: Previous Debtor. and Creditor Relationship a Condition of Account
Stated, 6 A.L.R. 2d 113 (1949).
Decisions: McLoed v. Power & Smith, 12 Ala. 9 (1847); Pike v. Zodig, 171 Colo.
273, 152 Pac. 923 (1915); Cory v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 47 N.J.L. 181 (1885).
176. Hayes v. Warren, 2 Str. 933, 93 Eng. Rep. 950 (1731); Osborne v. Roges, 1
Wm's Saund. 267a, note 2, 85 Eng. Rep. 318, 322 (1670).
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relies upon. But as the executed consideration is an indebtedness,
and the promise alleged to have been broken is one legally resulting from the fact of such indebtedness, the proof at the trial must
show a debt. It follows, therefore, that the action in reality is one
for the recovery of damages for the nonpayment of a money debt,
due upon a simple (executed) contract, such, for example, as upon
the sale of goods, or lands, 177 rendition of services, for work, labor
and materials, or on an account stated, as well as other similar
transactions resulting in the enrichment of the defendant at the
plaintiff's expense.
If a person requests another to do work for him under such circumstances that the other has a right to expect pay therefor, and
the latter does the work, the law will, as an inference of fact, imply a promise by the former to pay what the services were reasonably worth, and the action to recover such compensation is General
Assumpsit. So, if a man orders goods from another without an
express promise to pay a certain price, and they are delivered, the
seller may maintain General Assumpsit to recover their value. So,
if a person pays money which another should have paid, he may
maintain General Assumpsit against the latter to recover it, such a
count being known as a count for money paid by the plaintiff for
the use of the defendant. And where a man receives money which
in equity and good conscience belongs to another, the latter may
sue in General Assumpsit to recover, this count being known as
the count for money received by the defendant for the use of the
plaintiff, or for money had and received. And where a man lends
money to another without an express promise by the latter to repay it, he may recover the debt in General Assumpsit on a count
for money lent. And if parties state an account between them,
General Assumpsit lies for the balance, the count being known as a
count for a balance due on account stated. General Assumpsit is
also known as the common counts. The common counts are not
suited to enforce collateral undertakings, guaranties, and contracts
of indemnity.
Recovery on a fire insurance policy cannot be had on the common counts, as payment of the premiums is not sufficient of itself
to constitute a quid pro quo or raise an implied promise. Accordingly the promise itself and the conditions thereof must be specifically set forth. But in case of adjustment of the loss this makes an
account stated, and the implied promise to pay the amount due is
177. Nugent v. Teachout, 67 Mich. 571, 35 N.W. 254 (1887); Nelson v. Swan, 13
Fohns. 483 (N.Y. 1816).
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MONEY

COUNTS:

1. INDEBITATUS
COUNTS:

2.

OTHER

COUNTS:

GENERAL
ASSUMPSIT
OR
THE
COMMON
COUNTS:
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1. For money paid to
the defendant's use.
2. For money had and
received.
3. For money lent.
4. For interest due.
5. For money found to
be due on account
stated.
6. For use and occupation of land.
7. For board and lodging.
8. For land sold and
conveyed.
9. For goods sold and
delivered.
10. For goods bargained and sold.
11. For work, labor and
services.
12. For work, labor and
materials.
13. Any other circumstances on which a
debt may be founded.

1. QUANTUM
MERUIT

2.

VALUE

COUNTS:

COUNTS:

2. QUANTUM
VALEBANT
COUNTS:

3.

ACCOUNT
STATED:

McKELvEY, Principles of Common Law Pleading, c. II, § 39, 27 (N. Y. 1894).
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regarded as a different contract from the policy itself, which may
be enforced by the common counts. 178

Varieties of Common Counts
THE common counts in Indebitatus or General Assumpsit have
generally been classified as including (1) The Indebitatus Assumpsit or the Debt Counts; or (2) The Quantum Meruit and
Value Counts. Sometimes, for
Quantum Valebant Counts -the
purposes of convenience in discussion, they are set forth as follows: (1) The Indebitatus Counts; (2) The Quantum Meruit
Counts; (3) The Quantum Valebant Counts; and (4) The Account
Stated, as will appear from the chart on page 38.
(I) The Indebitatus Counts.- In an Indebitatus count in Assumpsit, the most comprehensive of all, the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant, on a certain day, at a certain place, was indebted
to him in a certain sum, for a certain described cause or consideration furnished by the plaintiff, and stating the consideration18 ° to
have been furnished at the special instance and request of the defendant.1 81 In general, time and place are immaterial.' 18 2 If the
suit is in a court of inferior jurisdiction, the declaration should
178. Heffron v. Roehester German Ins. Co., 220 Ill. 514, 77 N.E. 262 (1906).
The common counts will not lie against a guarantor who receives no direct personal
benefit. Cubbis v. Mississippi River Comm'n., 241 U.S. 351 (1915); Worley v. Johnson,
60 Fla. 294, 53 So. 543, 33 L.R.A. (n. s.) 639 (1906), involving an indorsee; Potter v.
404, 7 N.E. 568 (1886); Cf. Abe Lincoln Mut. Life & Accident Soc.
Gronbeck, 117 IlL.
v. Miller, 23 II. App. 341 (1881), holding that Debt lies by the beneficiaries to recover
a death benefit under a mutual benefit insurance certificate. See also Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 252 at 261 (1894).
179. Origin of the Common Counts: "In declaring in Debt, except possibly upon an
account stated, the plaintiff was required to set forth his cause of action with great
particularity. Thus, the Count in Debt must state the quantity and description of goods
sold, with the details of the price, all the particulars of a loan, the names of the persons to whom the money was paid with the amounts of each payment, the names of the
persons from whom money was received, to the use of the plaintiff with the amounts of
each receipt, the precise nature and amount of the services rendered. In Indebitatus
Assumpsit, on the other hand, the debt being laid as an Inducement or Conveyance, it
was not necessary to set forth all the details of the transaction from which it arose. It
was enough to allege the general nature of the indebtedness, as for goods sold, money
lent, money paid at the defendant's request, or upon an Account Stated, and that the
defendant being so indebted Promised to Pay. This was the origin of the Common
Counts." Ames, Lectures on Legal History, c. XIV, Implied Assumpsit, 153, 154 (Cambridge 1913).
180. Shipman, Handbook of Common-Law Pleading, c. XI, The Declaration in Contract Actions, 5 123, Statement of an Executed Consideration, 255, 256 (3rd ed. by Ballentine, St. Paul 1923).
181. Victors v. Davis, 12 M. & W. 758, 152 Eng. Rep. 1405 (1844).
A declaration in Indebitatus Assumpsit is good on general demurrer, even though it
states neither time, place, nor a request to pay. Keyser v. Shafer, 2 Cow. 437 (N.Y.
1823).
And consequently, in those states where special demurrers have been abolished," it
would seem that the allegation of some of these facts would- be unnecessary, though it is
certainly the better practice to allege them. McCrary v. Brown, 157 Ala. 518, 50 So.
402 (1909); McEwen v. Morey, 60 Ill. 32 (1871).
182. See Langer v. Parish, 8 Serg. & R. 134 (Pa. 1822), and cases there cited.
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allege that the cause of action arose within such jurisdiction. 18The sum stated in the declaration is generally also immaterial, provided it be laid to cover at least the actual amount due;"" the
cause of the debt, as well as the debt itself, should be included so
as to ground a subsequent plea of res judicata. 18 5 And, of course, it
must appear that the consideration for the debt was furnished at
the request of the defendant."' And these Indebitatus counts were
of two descriptions:
money counts relate only to
(A) The Money Counts.-The
money transactions as the basis of the debt, while the other counts
relate to any transaction other than a money transaction upon
which a debt may be founded. The,;e counts, in the order listed in
the chart above, will now be separately considered.
(1) The Count for Money Paid to the Defendant's Use.- This
theory underlying this count is that where one person allows or requests another to assume such a position that the latter may be
and is compelled to discharge a legal liability of the former, the
law creates or implies a request of the former to the latter to
make the payment, and a promise to repay him thus implied, and
the liability thus created may be enforced by an action of Indebitatus Assumpsit. As indicated by the heading such an action is
technically called an action for money paid by the plaintiff for the
use of the defendant; and in order to maintain a count for money
thus paid, it was necessary for the plaintiff to show, first, a payment in money, and secondly, such payment must have been paid
at the defendant's request. And money must actually have been
paid; a security such as a bond, or even stock, is not sufficient.1' s
This count will lie where a party has been compelled to pay a debt
that another should have paid. Thus, where a member of a firm
gave a promissory note, signed in the partnership name for a debt
183. This requirement is in

addition to the statement of the county as venue.

v. President, etc., of Nantucket Bank, 5 Mass 96 (1809);
307 (N.Y.

1812); Thornton v. Smith, 1 Wash. 81 (Va.

Briggs

Wetmore v. Baker, 9 Johns.

1792).

184. Webber v. Tivill, 2 Wm's Saund. 122, n. 3, 85 Eng. Rep. 840, 841 (1669).
185. Hibbert v. Courthope, Carth. 276, 90 Eng. Rep. 764 (1692). It is not necessary,
however, to give a particular description of the work done, or the goods sold, etc., Edwards v. Nichols, 3 Day 16 Fed. Cas. No. 4,296 (Conn. 1808); Crane v. Grossman, 27

Mich. 443 (1873); Lewis v. Culbertson, 11 Serg. & 1. 49 (Pa. 1824).
186. McGrary v. Brown, 157 Ala. 518, 50 So. 402 (1909); Caneld v. Merrick, 11
Conn. 425 (1836); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 185 Mass. 306, 70 N.E.
202 (1904). Cf. Somerville v. Grim, 17 W.Va. 1803 (1871).
The statement that money was "lent" implies that it was advanced at the request
of the defendant. But this does not apply to money "paid". Somerville v. Grim, 17 W.

Va. 803 (1871); Victors v. Davis, 16 M. & W. 758, 152 Eng Rep. 1405 (1844).
And the same is true of a count for goods sold and delivered. McEwert v. Morey,
60 Ill. 32 (1871).
187. Taylor v. Higgins, 3 East. 169, 102 Eng. Rep. 562 (1802);
East 1, 102 Eng. Rep. 1 (1800).

Jones v. Brinley, 1
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of his own, and his partner was compelled to pay it, it was held
that the latter might recover from the former as for money paid
to his use.18s And the same rule applied where one of several sureties, or other joint debtors, pays the whole debt. In such case he
is allowed to recover from each of the others his proportionate
shiare; and a request to pay and a promise to pay are feigned, in
order to entitle him to the remedy by an action of Indebitatus
Assumpsit. 189 The same is also true where a surety pays the debt
of his principal.19° Where the demaid paid was illegal the count
will also lie.'91
(2) The Count for Money Had oad Received. 2 2-The
theory
of this count is that whenever one person has received money to
which another person, in justice and good conscience, is entitled,
the law creates or implies a promise by the former to pay it to
the latter, and an action of Indebitatus will lie to enforce this liability on the basis of the fictitious promise.'9 3 The action is techni188. Cross v. Cheshire, 7 Exch. 43, 155 Eng. Rep. 848 (1851).
189. Harvey v. Drew, 82 Ill. 606 (1876); Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295
(1875); Doremus v. Selden, 19 Johns. 213 (N.Y. 1821); Steckel v. Steckel, 28 Pa.
233 (1857); Kemp v. Fender, 12 M. & W. 421, 152 Eng. Rep. 1262 (1844).
When several persons agree to contribute equally to certair expenditures, and one
advances more than his share, the excess is so much paid for the use of the others and
hence may be recovered in Indebitatus Assumpsit. Buckmaster v. Grendy, 3 Gil. 626
(Il1. 1840). Cf. Crain v. Hutchinson, 8 Ill. App. 179 (1880).
190. Crisfield v. State, 55 Md. 192 (1880); Alexander v. Vone, 1 M. & W. 511,
150 Eng. Rep. 537 (1836); Pownal v. Ferrand, 6 B. & C. 439, 108 Eng. Rep. 513 (1827).
191. De Begins v. Armisted, 10 Bing. 107, 131 Eng. Rep. 846 (1833).
192. See Browne, A Practical Treatise on Actions at Law, c. V, The Forms of Action,
§ 1, The Common Counts in General Assumpsit, 484, 367-385 (Philadelphia 1844);
Clark, Handbook on the Law of Contracts, c. 12, Quasi-Contracts,630 (3d ed. by Throckmorton, St. Paul 1914), for a collection of the cases and discussion of the doctrine.
193. Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760). See also the following cases: Federal: Swift & C. & B. Co. v United States, 111 U. S. 22 (1884);
Illinois: Gloyd v. Hotel La Salle Co., 221 Ill. App. 104 (1921); Bennett v. Connelly,
103 I1. 50 (1882); Devine v. Edwards, 101 Il. 138 (1881); Creel v. Kirkham, 47 Ill.
344 (1868); Watson v. Wolverton, 41 Ill. 241 (1866); Bradford v. City of Chicago, 25
Il. 349 (1861); Trumbull v. Campbell, 3 Gil. 502 (Ill. 1846); Johnson v. Salisburg, 3
Gil. 502 (111. 1846); Maryland: Vreeman v. McKaig, 4 Md. 450 (1853); Massachusetts: Ames v. Ashley, 4 Pick. 71 (Mass. 1826); Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass. 560 (1822);
Floyd v. Day, 3 Mass. 403 (1807); Michigan: Loomis v. O'Neil, 73 Mich. 582, 41 N.W.
701 (1889); Wright v. Dickinson, 67 Mich. 580, 35 N.W. 164 (1887); Walker v.
Conant, 65 Mich. 194, 31 N.W. 786 (1887); Brown v. School Dist. No. 9, 36 Mich. 149
(1877); Atkinson v. Scott, 36 Mich. 18 (1877); Catlin v. Birchard, 13 Mich. 110
(1865); New York: McRae v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460 (N.Y. 1835); Pennsylvania:
Miller v. Ord, 2 Bin. 382 (Pa. 1810); Barr v. Craig, 2 Dall. 151 (Pa. 1792); Virginia:
Johnson's Ex'rs v. Jennings' Adm'r, 10 Grat. 1 (Va. 1853).
A count for money had and received will lie only where defendant has received
money or other value equivalent to money, as a negotiable note. Thus, it lies against one
who has fraudulently procured the surrender of his own note. Penobscot R. R. Co. v. Mayo
67 Me. 470 (1878).
Assumpsit will not lie for money received by the defendant for the rent of land, the
title to which is claimed by the plaintiff, where his claim is disputed, since the title to
land cannot be tried in this form of action. Krau v. Case, 123 111. App. 214 (1905);
King v. Mason, 42 I1. 223 (1866); Lewis v. Robinson, 10 Watts 338 (Pa. 1840).
The owner of land may waive a trespass thereon, and, affirming the conversion, sue
in an action for money had and received one who severs wood, gravel, or other parts of
realty, and transforms it into money, but only when title to the land is not in dispute.
Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 236 Mass. 185, 128 N.E. 4
(1920).
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cally called an action for money received by the defendant for the
use of the plaintiff, or an actioa for money had and received.
Thus, where one person by means of duress, fraud, trespass, or
any other tort, obtains another's money, and converts it to his own
use, or obtains his property and sells the same, and converts the
proceeds, the other may waive the tort, and bring Assumpsit on a
promise, created by law, to repay the money so obtained.9 1 Or as
was said:
"Thoughts much too deep for tears pervade the Court,
When I Assumpsit bring, and, Godlike Waive the Tort."'9 5
The action will also lie to recover money paid by mistake of
fact, 196 as where money is paid as due upon the basis of erroneous
accounts, and, upon a true statement of account, it is found not to
be due. 19 7
The action will also lie to recover money paid on a consideration which has failed,' 98 as in a case where the purchaser of goods
194. Clark, Handbook on the Law of Contracts, c. 12, Quasi-Contracts, 632 (3d ed.
by Throckmorton, St. Paul 1914). See also the following cases: Illinois: Arnold v.
Dodson, 272 111.377, 112 N.E. 70 (1916); Stiles v. Easley, 51 Ill, 275 (1869); Alderson
455 (1864); ,McDonald v. Brown,
v. Ennor, 45 111.128 (1867); Staat v. Evans, 35 Ill.
16 I1.32 (1854); Massachusetts: Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 270, .17 N.E. 892 (1888);
Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 120 (Mass. 1831); Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 289 (Mass. 1827);
Michigan: Loomis v. O'Neal, 73 Mich. 582, 41 N.W. 701 (1889); Farrell v. Myers, 64
Mich. 234, 31 N.W. 128 (1887); Thompson v. Howard, 31 Mich. 309 (1875);
New Hampshire: Carleton v. Woodwood, 49 N.H. -314 (1870); New Jersey: Cory v.
Board of Chose Freeholders, 47 N.J.L. 181 --(1885); New York: People v. Wood, 121
N.Y. 522, 24 N.E. 952 (1890); Pennsylvania: Hindmarsh v. H1ffman, 127 Pa. 284, 18
All. 14 (1889); Gray v. Griffiths, 10 Watts 431 (Pa. 1840); Vermont: Stearns v. Dillingham, 22 Vt. 624 (1850); Wisconsin: Kiewest v. Rinds}opf, 46 Wis. 481, 1 N.W.
163 (1879); English: Noate v. Harding, 6 Exch. 349, 155- Eng. Rep. 577 (1857);
Atlee v. Backhouse, 3 M. & W. 633, 150 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1838); Shaw v. Woodcock,
'
7 B. & C. 73, 108 Eng. Rep. 652 (1827).
195. Verschures Creameries, Ltd. v. Hill & Netherlands S. S. Co., 2 K. B. 608 (1921);
Adolphus, The Circuiteers, An Eclogue, I L. Q. Rev. 232 (1835). It is a question of
electing to proceed on alternative theories of liability, where an obligation and a tort
liability arise from the same transaction.
196. Clark, Handbook on the Law of Contracts, c. 12, Quasi-Contracts, 637 (3d ed.
by Throckmorton, St. Paul 1914). See also the following cases: Illionis: Board of
Highway Comm'rs v. Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 97 N.E. 280 (1913); Wolf v. Beard,
138 (1881); Stempel v.
123 Ill. 585, 15 N.E. 161 (1888); Devine v. Edwards, 101 Ill.
Thomas, 89 Ill.
146 (1878); Maryland: Citizen's Bank v. Grafflin, 31 Md. 507 (1869);
Massachusetts: Stuart v. Sears, 119 Mass. 143 (1875); Michigan: Walker v. Conant,
65 Mich. 194, 31 N.W. 786 (1887); New York: Mayer v. Mayer, 63 N. Y. 455 (1875);
Pennsylvania: Chambers v. Union Nat. Bank, 78 Pa. 205 (1875); Thomas v. Brady, *10
PA. 164 (1848); Rhode Island: Hazard v. Franklin Mut. Fire Iis. Co., 7 R. I. 429
('1863); English: Bize v. Dickason,- 1 T. R. 285, 99 Eng. Rep. 1097 (1786).
197. Stuart v. Sears, 119 Mass.. 143 (1875); Townsend v. Crowdy, 8 C. B. (n. s.)
477, 141 Eng. Rep. 1251 (1860); Dails v. Lloyd, 12 Q.B. 531, 116 Eng. Rep. 967
(1848).
198. Illinois: Graffenreid v. Kundert, 31 Ill. App. 394 (1889); Lafflin v. Howe, 112
24 (1865); Massachusetts: Earle v. Bickford,
Ill. 253 (1885); Rainey v. Boyd, 39 Ill.
6 Allen 549 (Mass. 1863); Claflit v. Godfery, 21 Pick. 1 (Mass. 1838); Michigan:
Wright v. Diclunson, 67 Mich. 580,'35 N.W. 164 (1887); New York: Schwinger v.
Hickock, 53 N.Y. 280 (1873); Pennsylvania: Kauffelt v. Leber, 9 Watts & S. 93 (Pa.
1845); Virginia: Johnson's Ex'r v. Jennings' Adm'r, 10 Grat. 1 (Va. 1858); English:
Newsome v. Graham, 10'B-.'& C. 234, 109 Eng. Rep. 437 (1829); Clark, Handbook on
the Law of Contracts, c. "12, Quasi-Contracts,-640 (3d ed. by Throckmorton, St. Paul
1914).
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has paid the price and the seller fails to deliver the goods; 10 or
where the purchaser has paid for goods which did not belong to
200
the seller, and which have been reclaimed by the real owner;
or, in most jurisdictions, where bills, notes, bonds, stock, or other
securities have been sold and paid for, and they have turned out
to be forgeries, or for some other reason to be worthless.20'
(3) The Count for Money Lent. -To
sustain this count, the
plaintiff must show that there had been a loan, and of money.
Thus, a loan of stock would not support the action, 2 2 whereas a
loan of foreign money would. 20 3 The count will lie where money
has been delivered to a third party at the defendant's request,
provided credit was extended to the defendant, and he is the prin2 00
cipal debtor, and not merely collaterally liable.
And to establish a loan requires something more than a mere
showing of a payment of money by the plaintiff; this alone raises a
presumption of law that such payment was in discharge of the
debt and not by way of a loan. '-' Of course such presumption is
rebuttable by showing transactions between the parties from which
a loan may be inferred..2 1" And naturally a bill or a note in the
usual form will serve as evidence of money lent between the payee
and the drawer of the former and the payee and maker of the:
latter.207
(4) The Count for Interest Due.-The Common-Law rule as
to when interest was allowed was stated by Chief Justice Abbot in
the case of Higgins v. Sargent,"0 de'cided in 1823, where he declared: "It is now established as a general principle that interest
is allowed by law only upon merchantile securities, or in those
cases where there has been an express promise to pay interest, or
where such promise is to be implied from the usage of trade or other
circumstances."20 9 There were some instances, however, not within
199. Giles v. Edwards, 7 T. R. 181, 101 Eng. Rep. 920 (1797).
200. Hook v. Robison, Add. 271 (Pa. 1795); Eicholz v. Dannister, 34 L.J.C.P. 105,
144 Eng. Rep. 284 (1864).
201. Wilson v. Alexander, 3 Scam. 392 (Ill. 1842); Tyler v. Bailey, 71 Ill. 34 (i873);
Lunt v. Wrenn, 113 Il. 168 (1885); Claflin v. Godfrey, 21 Pick. 1 (Mass. 1838); Ripley v. Case, 88 Mich. 261, 49 N.W. 46 (1891); Kauffelt v. Leber, 9 Watts & S. 93
(Pa. 1845); Westropp v. Solomon, 137 Eng. Rep. (1849).
And money paid on a purchase of land to which the vendor and grantor has no
title may be so recovered.
Desmesmey v. Gravelin, 56 Ill. 93 (1870). Cf. Laflin v.

Howe, 112 Il. 253 (1885);

Trinkle v. Reeves, 25 111. 214 (1861).

202. Nightingale v. Devisme, 5 Burr. 2589, 98 Eng. Rep. 361

(1770).

203. Harrington v. Macmorris, 5 Taunt. 228, 128 Eng. Rep. 675 (1813).
204. Poole v. Vabanes, 8 T. R. 328, 101 Eng. Rep. 1416 (1799).
205. Welsh v. Seaborn.

I'Stark. 474, 171 Eng. Rep. 534 (1816).

206. Cary v. Gerrish, 4 Esp. 9, 170 Eng. Rep. 624 (1801).
207. Douglas v. Holme, 12 Ad. & E. 641, 113 Eng. Rep. 957 (1840); Curtis v.
Rickards, 1 Mac. & G. 46, 133 Eng. Rep. 241 (1840).
208. 2 B. & C. 348, 107 Eng. Rep. 414 (1823).
209. Higgins v. Sargent, 2 B. & C. 346, 349, 107 Eng. Rep. 414, 415 (1828).
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the scope of the statement above, where interest was allowed, as
where money was awarded to be paid on a day certain, if the
money had been demanded, provided the plaintiff proceeded by
action, 210 and not by attachment.2 11- In cases not falling within the
first statement above, interest was in general not recoverable.
By a series of statutes, however, the common-law rules as to the
allowance of interest have been considerably altered. This began with the Statute of 3 & 4 Win. IV, c. 42, enacted in 1833.
Section 28 provided that "Upon all debts or sums certain payable
at a certain time or otherwise, the jury (on the Trial or Inquiry)
may allow interest, at a rate not exceeding the current rate, from
the time when such debts or sums certain were payable, if such
debts or sums be payable by virtue of some written instrument at
a certain time; or if payable otherwise, then from the time when
demand of payment shall have beci:. made in writing, so as such
demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from that date of such demand until the term of payment,
provided that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is
now payable by law."
Section 29 provided that "the Jury on the Trial or Inquiry may
give Damages in the nature of intej est over and above the value
of the goods at the time of the conversion and seizure in all Actions
of Trover or Trespass de bonis asportatis, and over and above the
money recoverable in all actions o,, policies of assurance made
after the passing of the act."
Section 30 provided that "if on Writ of Error the Judgment be
for the defendant, the Court shall allow interest for such time as
the execution has been delayed by tie Writ of Error."
The Statute of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. § 17, provided: "That every
Judgment Debt shall carry interest, at the rate of four per cent.,
from the time of entering up the Judgment, or from the time of
the commencement of this act in cases of Judgment then entered
up, and not carrying interest, until the same shall be satisfied, and
such interest may be levied under a Writ of Execution on such
Judgment."
this
(5) The Count Found to be Due on Account Stated. -As
count appears as number four in the Classification of the common
counts, it will be discussed at that point and not as one of the
Indebitatus counts, although it fits in in legal theory.
For other
210. Pinhorn v. Tuckington, 3 Camp. 468, 170 Eng. Rep. 1448 (1813).
instances, see Browne, A Practical Treatise on Actions at Law, c. VI, The Forms of
Action, § 9, Interest, 387 (Philadelphia 1844).
211. Churcher v. Stringer, 2 B. & Ad. 777, 109 Eng. Rep. 1334 (1831).
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(B) Other Counts: (1) The Common Count for Use and Occupation. 12 - At common law the action of Indebitatus Assumpsit
13
was not available for use and occupation.2 - The reason for this as

worked out by Dean James Barr Ames, was connected with the
nature of rent. On a lease for years, reserving a rent, as well as
on a sale of goods, originally Debt was the only remedy. In both
cases the obligation to pay did not arise out of a contract in the
modem sense, as Debt for goods sold was based on the theory of a
grant, 14 whereas Debt for rent was a reservation. As to the sale
of goods, the situation was altered by the development of Assumpsit, under which Indebitatus Assumpsit was extended into the field
of Debt, first, by holding that Assumpsit would lie where a promise to pay a debt was made subsequent to the time when the
debt was created, and second, by holding that either Debt or Indebitatus Assumpsit would lie where the promise to pay the debt
was made at the time the debt was created. This second development came in 1603 in Slade's Cast?,2 15 in which it was decided
"that the buyer's words of agreement, which had before operated
only as a grant, imparted also a promise, so that the seller might,
without more, sue in Debt or Assumpsit, at his option."' 6
But the courts refused to take this step in the case of rent, and
apparently there was only one case " ' of Indebitatus Assumpsit for
rent prior to legislative intervention. In that case, Slack v. Bowsal,211 decided in 1623, the reporter observed:

"Note, there was

not any exception taken, that the assumpsit is to pay a sum for
rent; which is a real and specil duty, as strong as upon a Specialty; and in case this action lies not without some Special Cause of
Promise."2 1 9 And Dean Ames cites cases to support the view that

thereafter the plaintiff failed to recover in Indebitatus Assumpsit,
212. In general, on the development of Indebitatus Assumpsit as a remedy to recover
damages for use and occupation, see:

Treatises: Ames, Lectures

on Legal History, Lecture XV, Assumpsit for Use and

Occupation, 167 (Cambridge 1913); 7 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 262-275
(Boston 1926); 3 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, c. XV, Indebitatus Assumpsit,
180 (Northport 1906); Walsh, A History of Anglo-American Law, c. XV, Incorporael

Interests, §§ 136, 137, 256-260 (2d ed. Indianapolis 1932).
Comments: Quasi-Contract-Assumpsit for Use and Occupation Against a Trespasser
in Modern Cases, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1087 (1932); Quasi-Contracts-Use and Occupation-

Recovery of Benefits Received by a Tresspasse, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1190 (1936).
213. Gibson v. Kirk, 1 Q. B. 850, 113 Eng. Rep. 1357 (1841).
214. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Lecture XV, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation,
167 (Cambridge 1913).
215. 4 Co. 92b, 76 Eng. I4ep. 1074 (1603).
216. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Lecture XV, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation,

167 (Cambridge 1913).
217. Slack v. Bowsal, Cro. Jac. 668, 79 Eng. Rep. 578 (1623).
218. Ibid.
219. Slack v. Bowsal, Cro. Jac. 668, at 668, 79 Eng. Rep. 578, 579 (1623).
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both where there was a subsequent express promise to pay, as well
22as where there was no such promise. 1
Indebitatus Assumpsit was made concurrent with Debt in order
to evade trial by wager of law, but this incentive was lacking in
the case of rent, as wager of law .vas not available in Debt for
rent. And as the executor of a lessee was chargeable in Debt, Assumpsit, which permitted suit against the executor of a buyer or
borrower, added no additional advavtage. Hence, as Dean Ames
suggests, the courts found no reason why they should extend Indebitatus Assumpsit into the field of debt for rent. In time, however, the landlord was permitted in certain cases to sue in Special
Assumpsit and in Debt, an innovation brought about by the continuing struggle between the Royal Courts for jurisdiction. As
Special Assumpsit was a branch of Trespass on the Case, over
which King's Bench had jurisdiction, this part of its jurisdiction
was expanded to cover the situation, as it had no jurisdiction over
case arising by original writ in Debt. In its earliest attempt, as in
the case of Symcock v. Payn,2 2 1 the court sought to justify its
usurpation by construing agreements concerning leases as not creating a rent. In 1634, in the case of Acton v. Syrnonds, 222 it was
held that Indebitatus Assumpsit would lie concurrently with Debt
where it appeared that at the time of the lease, the lessee had expressly promised to pay the rent. The argument was summarized in
a report of the same case in Rolles' Abridgement, 223 where it was
said: "The action lay, because it appeared that it was intended by
the parties that a lease should be made and a rent reserved, and
for better security of payment thereof that the lessor should have
his remedy by action of Debt upon the reservation, or action upon
this collateral promise at his election, and this being the intent at
the beginning, the making of the lease though real would not toll
this collateral promise, as a man may covenant to accept a lease at
a certain rent and to pay the rent according to the reservation; for
they are two things, and so the promise of payment is a thing collateral to the reservation, which will continue though the lessee
assign over." According to Dean Ames, this doctrine, as recognized by the Court of King's Bench, was adopted by the Court of
Exchequer in the case of Trevor v. Roberts,22 ' decided in 1664, and
220. Ames,

Lectures

on Legal History,

e.

XV,

167 (Cambridge 1913).
221. Cro. Eliz. 786, 78 Eng. Rep. 1016 (1621).
222. Jones, W. 364, 82 Eng. Rep. 190 (1634).
223. 1 Rolle, Abridgement, 8, pl. 10, (1634).
224. Hardr, 366, 145 Eng. Rep. 500 (1664).

Assumpsit for Use and Occupation,
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by the Court of Common Bench in the case of Johnson v. May, 25
decided in 1683. And, as Debt originally would not lie upon a
Quantum Meruit count,2 26 Assumpsit thus filled a gap in the remedial law, as it lay where the sum to be recovered was idefinite or
uncertain, with the consequence that Debt would not lie.227

Against this background, in the year 1737, the Statute of 11 GCeo.
II, c. 19, was enacted. To remedy the inconvenience of suing for
the recovery of rents, where the demises were not by deed, Section 14 provided: "That it shall be lawful for a landlord, when the
agreement is not by deed, to reasonable satisfaction for the lands,
tenements, or hereditaments held or occupied by the defendant, in
an action on the Case, for the use and occupation of what was so
held or enjoyed; and if in evidence on the trial of such action any
parol or demise, or any agreement (not bing by deed), whereon a
certain rent is reserved, shall appear, the plaintiff in such action
shall not therefore, be non-suited, but may make use thereof as an
evidence of the quantum of damages to be recovered." From the
language of the statute, it is evident that it was designed to eliminate two earlier difficulties which barred the use of Indebitatus
Assumpsit for use and occupation; first, to prevent a plaintiff from
being non-suited on the ground of a variance, where the plaintiff
had sued upon a quantum meruit count, and it appeared from the
evidence that the demise was for a sum certain, for which Debt
was the proper remedy; and second, to escape from the necessity
of proving an express promise at the time of the demise, where the
plaintiff was suing to recover a sum certain, and it was the removal
of this second difficulty which gave the statute its chief significance. Dean Ames summed up the matter, when he declared:
"Thereby Indebitatus Assumpsit became concurrent with Debt upon all Parol Demises. In other words, the Statute gave to the landlord, in 1738 what Slade's Case gave to the seller of goods, the
lender of money, or the employee, in 1602; namely, the right to
sue in Assumpsit as well as in Debt, without proof of an Independent Express Promise."

228

Although the statute only mentioned an action on the Case,
which meant Indebitatus Assumpsit, Debt for use and occupation
still remained available,29 even where there was an express de225. 3 Lev. 150, 83 Eng., Rep. 624 (1683) .
226. Mason v. Weland, Skin. 238, 90 Eng. Rep. 109'(1685).
227. King v. Stephens, 2 Rolle 435, 81 Eng. Rep. 900 (1623).
228. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, c. XV, Assumpsit for Use and Occoupation,
170 (Cambridge 1913).
229. Wilkins v. Wingate, 6 T. R. 62, 101 Eng. Rep. 436 (1794).
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mise, but not by deed.2 30 Thus, the action of Indebitatus Assumpsit for use and occupation became -- remedy in all these cases in
which the demise, or agreement was not by deed, and where the
defendant had had an actual or constructive occupation; but where
the demise or agreement was by deed, the action would not lie, in
which case the remedy was in Debt or covenant on the demise or
231
agreement.
As the action for use and occupation was based on the landlordtenant relationship, express or implied, and as the statute was construed as limited to cases, where by mutual agreement, the person
in possession of the land was to pay either a sum certain or a
reasonable compensation to the owvner, it was not possible to
charge a trespasser in Assumpsit for use and occupation.
As to pleading, it was not necessary to allege where the premises
were located, as the venue was transitory.2 32 And where a rent had
been agreed upon, that was the measure of damages, even though
the lease was void,2 32 otherwise they would be the value of the
premises, which should be proved. °- 4 It was not permissible to
2 3
join a count on a demise and a count for use and occupation. 1
(2) The Count for Board and Lodging. - In this count the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was indebted for certain rooms,
apartments and furniture, used and enjoyed at the special request
of the said defendant; and for meat, drink, fire and candles, and
other necessaries, found and provided by the plaintiff at the defendant's special request; that the said defendant undertook and
faithfully promised the plaintiff to pay him so much money as he
reasonably deserved to have of the said defendant; plus an averment as to the amount of money the plaintiff reasonably deserved.
(3) The Count for Land Sold and Conveyed. -The Indebitatus counts include a count for real property sold. It has been held
in many cases, that where the agreement to pay the price of land
was to pay the same in money, such price could be recovered un2 3a
der a General Indebitatus count for land sold and conveyed.
(4) The Count for Goods Sold and Delivered.- The Indebita230. Gibson v. Kirk, 1 Gale & D. 252 (1841).
231. 1 Rolle, Abridgement 7, Action sur Case (London 1668).
232. King v. Fraser, 6 East 348, 102 Eng. Rep. 1320 (1805).
233. De Medina v. Poison, Holt. 47, 171 Eng. Rep. 157 (1815).
234. Thompson v. Day, 2 B. & B. 680 (1810).
235. Arden v. Pullen, 9 M. & W. 430, 152 Eng. Rep. 492 (1842).
236. Elder v. Hood, 38 11. 533 (1865); Pike v. Brown, 7 Cush. 133 (Mass. 1851);
Feleh v. Taylor, 13 Pick..133 (Mass. 1832); Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 (1813);
Nugent v. Teachout, 67 Mich. 571, 35 N.W. 254 (1887); Whitbeck v. Whitbeck, 9
Cow. 266 (N.Y. 1828); Bowen v. Bell, 20 Johns. 338 (N.Y. 1823); Nelson v. Swan,
13 Johns. 483 (N.Y. 1816); Siltzell v. Michael, 3 Watts & S. 329 (Pa. 1842).
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tus count for goods sold and delivered lies only where there has
been a delivery of the goods to the defendant, or something equivalent to a delivery, as for instance, putting it within the plaintiff's
power to take them himself.2- 7 And whenever goods are sold.
under a special contract fixing the price to be paid, the action to
recover the price is either special assumpsit on the contract or the
price of the goods, which the law implies to be their value, may
be recovered in General Assumpsit. But where the debt is not due
from the defendant immediately, a count for goods sold and delivered will not lie and the action must be Special Assumpsit. But
where there has been a delivery, the action may be either in In23
debitatus Assumpsit, or on a Quantum Valebant count.
We have previously seen that where goods are wrongfully obtained and converted into money, Jndebitatus Assumpsit will lie
by the owner to recover the money received for his use, but that
such form of Assumpsit will not lie where the goods are not converted into money by the'wrongdoer. 2. 9 Whether Assumpsit in any
form will lie in the latter case is not clear. Some courts hold that
the only remedy is in tort, as by an action of Trover.2 4
Other
courts, however, hold that the owner of the goods may waive the
tort, and sue in Indebitatus Assumpsit for the goods, as upon a
41
fictitious sale, and promise to pay for them.2
237. Seckle v. Scott, 66 Ill. 106 (1872); Smith v. Chance, 2 B. & A. 755, 106 Eng.
Rep. 540 (1819).
238. Toledo, W. & W. By. Co. v. Chew, 67 Ill. 378 (1873); Wadsworth v. Gay, 118
Mass. 44 (1878); Knight v. New England Worsted Co., 2 Cush. 271 (Mass 1848);
Shearer v. Jewett, 14 Pick. 232 (Mass. 1833); Loring v. Gurney, 5 Pick. 15 (Mass.
1827); Goodrich v. Lafflin, 1 Pick. 57 (Mass. 1822); Markin v. Mitchell & Rowland
Lumber Co., 42 Mich. 296, 3 N.W. 904 (1879); Wilson v. 'Wagar, 26 Mich. 452
(1873); Clark v. Moore, 3 Mich. 55 (1853); Willson v. Foree, 6 Johns. 110 (N.Y.
1810); Adams v. Columbian Steamboat Co., 3 Whart. 75 (Pa. 1838).
239. Thus, a sale of an automobile to which the manufacturer had title, was held to
be a conversion by the party who sold it, for which the manufacturer could maintain
trover or he could waive the tort action and recover on the common counts, after disposition of the car for money or other property. Finney v. Studebaker Corp., 196 Ala.
422, 72 So. 54 (1916); Parker v. Lee, 19 Ga. App.. 499, 91 S.E. 912 (1917).
240. Strother's Adm'r v. Butler, 17 Ala. 733 (1850); Androscoggin Water Power Co. v.
Metcalf, 65 Me. 40 (1876); Allen v. Ford, 19 Pick. 217 (Mass. 1837); Jones v. Hoar, 5
Pick. 285 (Mass. 1837); Galloway v. Holmes, 1 Doug. 330 (Mich. 1844); of. Aldine
Mfg. Co. v. Barnard, 84 Mich. 632, 48 N.W. 280 (1891); Kansas City, St. J. & C. B.
By. Co., 79 Mo. 278 (1883); Bethlehem Borough v. Perseverana Fire Co., 81 Pa. 445
(1876). See also Clark, Handbook on the Law of Contracts, c. VI, 632 (3d ed., St.
Paul 1914).
And in such jurisdictions, where the goods taken have been turned into money,
there can be no recovery on a count for goods sold and delivered; the count must be for
money had and received. Brown v. Holbrook, 4 Gray.103 (Mass. 1855); Allen v. Ford,
19 Pick. 217 (Mass. 1837).
Where one wrongfully converts personal property, but does not receive. any money
therefor, the tort cannot be waived, and an action ex contractu brought, because, until the
wrongdoer has received money to which the owner of the property is entitled, there can
be no action for money had and received, or upon an implied promise to pay. Woodruff
v. Zaban & Son, 133 Ga. 24, 65 S.E. 123 (1909).
241. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Chew, 67 Ill. 378 (1873); Aldine Mfg. Co. v.
Barnard, 84 Mich. 602, 48 N.W..280 (1891); Evans v. Miller, 58 Miss. 120 (1880);
Terry v. Munger, 121 N.Y. .161, 24 N.E. 272 (1890); Goodwin v. Griffis, 88 N.Y. 629
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(5) The Count for Goods Bargained and Sold. -The common
count for goods sold and delivered lies in those cases only in which
there has been an actual or constructive delivery; but the count for
goods bargained and sold lies where there has been a complete
sale but no delivery. It is necessary, however, that the property
in the goods should have become vwsted in the vendee by virtue
of such sale.242 The right of property must be in the vendee, though
the right of possession may be in the vendor; and although a sale
be completed and binding in other respects, no property passes
where anything material requires to be done before the delivery,
to ascertain the price thereof, or the specific goods sold, and goods
bargained and sold therefor will not in such case lie. And so in
the case of manufactured goods, unless the goods are specifically
appropriated to the vendee, with his assent, no property passes,
24 3
and goods bargained and sold will not lie.
(6) The Count for Work, Labor and Services. - When work is
done or services are rendered, not under a special contract as to
compensation, but under such circumstances that the law will imply a promise to pay what they are worth, or where, though done
or rendered under a special contract, that contract has been fully
performed, General Assumpsit will lie to recover compensation
therefor. So in the case of goods sold, and as explained in treat24 4
ing of such cases, the action may be in Indebitatus Assumpsit,
245
or on the Quantum Meruit.
(1882); Willson v. Force, 6 Johns. 110 (N.Y. 1810); McCullough v. McCullough, 14
Pa. 295 (1850); Finney v. MeMahon, 1 Yeates 248 (Pa. 1793); Walker v. Duncan, 68
Wis. 624, 32 N.W. 689 (1887); Russell v. Bell, 10 M. & W. 340, 152 Eng. Rep. 500
(1842); Clark, Handbook on the Law of Contracts, c. VI, 646 (3d ed., St. Paul 1914).
But Compare: Johnston v. Sailbury, 61 Ill.
316 (1871); Creel v. Kirkham, 47 Il1.
344 (1868); Tuttle v. Campbell, 74 Mich. 652, 42 N.W. 384 (1889); Weiler v. Kerohner, 109 Pa. 219 (1885); Bayer v. Bullard, 102 Pa. 555 (1883); Thurston v. Mills, 16
East 254, 104 Eng. Rep. 1085 (1812).
Where there has been a tortious taking or detention of property, which has not been
sold by the tortfeasor, the owner may waive the tort and recover the fair value thereof
in an action of assumpsit upon an, account for goods sold and delivered. Conoway v.
Pepper, 7 Boyce 511, 108 Atl. 676 (Del. 1919).
Where the defendant appropriates the plaintiff's property, the plaintiff may waive the
tort and maintain an action of assumpsit for thu value of the property, even though the
defendant had not sold and converted the same into money. Daniels v. Foster & Kleiser,
95 Ore. 502, 187 Pac. 627 (1920). See also an article by Deinard & Deinard, Election
of Remedigs, 6 Minn. L. Rev. 341, 358, 360, 502, 504 (1922).
242. Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 277, 108 Eng. Rep. 1046 (1828).
243. Ibid.
244. Fuller v. Brown, 11 Metc. 440 (Mass. 1846); Harris v. Christian, 10 Pa. 233
(1849); Miles v. Moodie, 3 Serg. & R. 211 (Pa. 1817); Kelly v. Foster, 2 Bin. 4, (Pa.
1809).
Indebitatus Assumpsit will not lie for work and labor where the plaintiff has been
discharged without performance. The action must be on the special agreement. Algeo v.
Algeo, 10 Serg. & R. 235 (Pa. 1823).
245. Frazier v. Gregg, 20 Ill.
299 (1858); Atkins v. Barnstable County, 97 Mass. 428
(1867); King v. Welcome, 5 Gray 41 (Mass. 1855); Money v. Work Iron Co., 82 Mich.
263, 46 N.W. 376 (1890); Allen v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 449 (1858); Summers v. McKim,
12 Serg. & R. 405 (Pa. 1825).
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(II) Value Counts: (A) Quantum Meruit.- The first of the
value counts, quantum meruit, is used where the plaintiff has performed services, and he alleges that, in consideration that the
plaintiff, at the request of the defendant had done certain work,
he, the defendant, promised the plaintiff to pay him so much
money as he therefor reasonably deserved to have, and that the
246
plaintiff deserved to have a certain sum.
(B) Quantum Valebant. - The second of the value counts,
quantum valebant, is used where the plaintiff has sold goods for
or to the defendant, and he alleges that the defendant, in consideration thereof, promised the plaintiff to pay him so much as the
goods were reasonably worth, and that they were reasonably worth
24 7
a certain sum.
(C) The Absorption of the Quantum Meruit and Quantum
Valebant Counts into the Indebitatus Counts. - As Debt originally lay for a sum certain only,,that action could not be maintained
on the facts of a Quantum Meruit or a Quantum Valebant, because
of the uncertainty of the sum involved. But when Debt was extended to such implied obligations, under the maxim Id certum
est quod certum reddi potest that is certain which can be made
certain], and the Indebitatus count in Assumpsit followed suit, in
permitting evidence to reduce an uncertain sum to certainty, it thus
was made possible to maintain the action on such factual situations. The value count of Quantum Meruit and Quantum Valebant, in the eyes of the legal profession in, England, came to be
regarded as unnecessary, their original scope and purpose being
brought within the purview of the Indebitatus count in Assumpsit
and in Debt. In recognition of this fact the Regulations of Trinity
Term, in 1831, prescribed a common form for the common counts
of Indebitatus Assumpsit and account stated, simplifying and relieving them from "unnecessary verbiage".241
In the United States the use of the value counts is now not necessary, since the reasonable value of goods sold and delivered or
work and labor done may be recovered upon an Indebitatus
count. 242 Thus, in Parker v. McComber,250 where the plaintiff
brought Indebitatus Assumpsit for board and maintenance, with
the declaration containing four counts, for goods sold and deliver•24 6. See 1 Sounders, Pleading and Evidence, Assumpsit, Form of Remedy, 139, 140
(Plhiladelphia 1831).
247. Id. at 140.
248. Martin, Civil Procedure at Common Law, c. II, Personal Actions Ex Contractu,
Art. iI, Assumpsit, § 57, Common Counts, 57 (St. Paul 1905).
249. Norris v. School District No. 1, 12 Mich. 293 (1835).
250. 17 R. I. 674, 24 Atl. 464 (1892).
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ed, work and labor, money had and received, and for interest, and
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, after which the defendant sought a new trial, on the ground that the evidence as to the
services rendered were not admissable without a Quantum Meruit
count, the court denied a new trial, declaring: "We think it [the
evidence] is sufficient. A count in Quantum Meruit, as well as one
in Indebitatus Assumpsit for work, labor, skill, care, diligence, etc.,
claims a certain sum due. In either case the plaintiff may recover
less, and the judgment is for so much of his stated claim as is
found to be justly merited. The counts in Quantum Meruit and in
Quantum Valebant are therefore unnecessary in any case." 51
The effect, therefore, of the Norris and Parker decisions has been
to reduce the common counts to the Indebitatus counts and to the
account stated, the latter of which will now be considered.
(III) The Common Count on an Account Stated.112 - The
action of Indebitatus Assumpsit lies to recover the balance due
upon an account stated, for the law implies a promise to pay it.
The account stated must be with reference to former transactions
between the parties, or some debt for which an action or suit
would lie, or some demand which the defendant ought morally
and in justice to pay;2 3 if not, the count is not maintainable. The
rule as to when tho count on an account stated will lie, was laid
down in the case of Porter v. Cooper,254 by Baron Parke, who declared: "I take the rule to be this, that if there is an admission of
a sum of money being due for which an action would lie, that will
2
be evidence to go to the jury on the count for an account stated." 11
256
Thus, an account stated is an acknowledgement of debt.
But the common counts may not be used to enforce a promise to
pay a supposed tort liability for damages inflicted.
25 7

VII. CONTRACTS OF RECORD AND STATUTORY LIABILITIES
Action on judgment
A JUDGMENT of a court directing the payment of money clearly
251. Parker v. McComber, 17 R.I. 674, 24 Atl. 464 (1892).
252. In general, on the account stated, see 29 L. R. A. (n. s.) 334 (1911).
253. Clark v. Webb, 7 Cr. M. & R. 29, 149 Eng. Rep. 980 (1830).
254. 1 Cr. M. & R. 387, 149 Eng. Rep. 1130 (1834).
255. Porter v. Cooper, 1 Cr. M. & R. 387, 394, 149 Eng. Rep. 1130, 1133 (1834).
256. Malkin v. L'Brein, 33 Ill. App. 474 (1892); Throop v. Sherwood, 4 Gil. 92
(Ill. 1847); Marshall v. Lewark, 117 Ind. 377, 20 N.E. 253 (1889); Hoyt v. Wilkinson,
10 Pick. 31 (Mass. 1830); Watkins v. Ford, 69 Mich. 357, 37 N.W. 300 (1888);
Stevens v. Fuller, 4 Mich. 387 (1857); Parker & Son v. Clemons, 80 Vt. 521, 68 Atl.
646 (1908); Warren v. Caryl, 61 Vt. 331, 17 Atl. 741 (1889); Hopkins v. Logan, 5 M.
& W. 241, 151 Eng. Rep. 103 (1839); Irving v. Veitch, 3 M. & W. 106, 150 Eng. Rep.
1069 (1837).
257. In general, on contracts of record and statutory liabilities, see note, 11 Ann. Cas.
656 (1910).
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cannot be regarded as a true contract, for the element of agreement is wanting. 58 Whether or not Assumpsit will lie depends on
the character of the judgment. Assumpsit will only lie on a simple
contract, or a quasi-contractual obligation having the force and

effect of a simple-contract debt. It will not lie on a contract under
seal, or on any other specialty. A judgment of a court of record,
not being a foreign court, is not merely evidence of the debt, but
is conclusive evidence of it. It is a specialty, and therefore Indebitatus Assumpsit will not lie.211
It was long ago determined, however, that the judgment of a
foreign court is merely evidence of the debt, and not conclusive, so
that it has only the force of a simple contract, and therefore Indebitatus Assumpsit may be maintained upon it. 2 10 The action will

also lie on a domestic judgment of an inferior court not of record,
since it is not a specialty. 26 1 Some of the courts have therefore held
that Indebitatus Assumpsit will lie on a justice's judgment; but
there are decisions to the contrary, on the ground that even a
justice's jiudgment is conclusive, and therefore a specialty.262
It was at one time held in some states that the judgment of a
court of record in a sister state is of the same effect as any other
foreign judgment - merely evidence of the debt - so that Indebitatus Assumpsit will lie upon it; 2

3

but, in view of the Full

Faith and Credit provision of the Federal Constitution that a
judgment rendered in one state shall have the same force and
validity in every other state as in the state in which it was rendered, a judgment of a court of record of one state is conclusive evidence of the debt in every other State (except that it may be attacked for fraud or want of jurisdiction), and therefore a specialty,
258. State v. Mayor, 109 U.S. 285 (1883); Belford v. Woodward, 158 Il.
N.E.

1097

(1856);

Roe v. Halbert, 17 I1,

572

(1856);

O'Brien v.

135, 41

Young, 95 N.Y.

428 (1884).
259. DuBois v.

Seymour, 152 Fed. 600 (1907);

Andrews v.

Montgomery, 19 Johns.

162 (N.Y. 1821).
260. Federal: Mellin v. Harlick, 31 Fed. 865 (7 C. C. A. 1887); Massachusetts:
Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Mass. 273 (1811); New York: Hubbell v. Coudrey, 5 Johns. 130
(N.Y. 1809); Vermont: Rubber Factory v. Holt, 14 Vt. 92 (1842); English: Grant v.
Easton, L. R. 12 Q. B. D. 302 (1883); Hall v. Odber, 11 East 124, 103 Eng. Rep. 949
(1809); Sadler v. Robbins, 1 Camp. 253, 170 Eng. Rep. 948 (1808); Bushanan v.
Rucker, 1 Camp. 63, 170 Eng. Rep. 877 (1807); Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug. 4, 99 Eng.
Rep. 1 (1778).
261. Green v. Fry, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); Williams v. Jones, 13 M. & W. 631, 153
Eng. Rep 264 (1845).
262. IJames v. Henry, 16 Johns. 233 (N.Y. 1819); Pease v. Howard, 14 Johns, 479
(1817); Bain v. Hunt, 10 N. C. 572 (1825); Adair's Adm'r v. Rogers' Adm'r, Wright
428 (Ohio 1834).
The judgment of a justice of the peace in' another state is not a specialty debt of
record. Collings v. Modisett, 1 Blackf. 60 (Ind. 1820); Robinson v.' Prescott, 4 N. H.
450 (1828); Mahurin v. Bickford, 6 N.H. 567 (1833).
263. Pawling v. Willson,' 13 Johns. 192 (N.Y. 1816); Hitchcock v. Aiken, 1 Caines,
460 (N.Y. 1803); Lamkin v. Nance, 2 Brev. 99 (S. C. 1806).
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and it necessarily follows that it will not support the action of
2 °4
Indebitatus Assumpsit. The remedy is Debt.
Liability Imposed by Statute
WHERE an obligation to pay money is imposed by statute, it may
be enforced by an action of Indebitatus Assumpsit. Illustrations of
such an obligation arise where a statute imposes a duty upon one
county or parish to pay another for money expended in the support of a pauper, or where a statute allows an action to recover
usury paid, or money lost and paid on a wager. But Indebitatus
Assumpsit will not lie if the statute prescribed some other remedy
and impliedly excludes the remedy by Indebitatus Assumpsit.2t 5
VIII.

ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS IN INDEBITATUS ASSuMPsrr OR
COMMON COUNTS

form of the declaration in Indebitatus (General) Assumpsit
is very simple, and needs scarcely any discussion. The chief difficulty is in determining when Genera] Assumpsit will lie. Instead
of stating the concrete facts of the cause of action, the common
counts state only general conclusions of law, as the defendant is
indebted for money had and received, or some other vague reason.
These general statements do not disclose the exact ground of the
liability, or assist in presenting the issue of law and fact on which
the case depends. They are covenient in avoiding the danger of a
variance and concealing the real basis of the claim, but violate the
true principles and policies of pleading."'
THE

264. Moorhead v. Grisham, 12 Ark. 431 (1848); Garland v. Tucker, 1 Bibb 361
(Ky. 1809); McKim, v: Odom, 12 Me. 94 (1835); Andrews v. Montgomery, 19- ohns.
162 (1821); Cf. Shumway y. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447 (N.Y. 1831); Boston India Rubber Factory v. Holt, 14 Vt. 92 (1842). But see Black, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments, Including the Doctrine of Res Judicata, c. IX, §§ 853-873 (2d ed., St. Paul 1902).
In some states the' courts have gone even further, and held that the judgment'.of a
court of record in a sister state is so conclusive that it cannot be attacked even for fraud.
McRae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick. 53 (Mass. 1832).
265. Federal: Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Jolliffe, 2 Wall. 450 (U.S. 1864); Illinois:
Board of Sup'rs of Sangamon County v. Springfield, 63 111. 66 (1872); Massachusetts:
Inhabitants of Milford v. Commissioner, 144 Mass. 64, 10 N.E. 516 (1887); Watson v.
Inhabitants of Cambridge, 15 Mass. 286 (1818); Inhabitants of Bath v. Inhabitants of
Freeport, 5 Mass. 325 (1809); Michigan: Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345 (1878); New
York: McCoun v. New York Cent..& H. R. Ry. Co., 50 N.Y. 176 (1872); Vermont:
Woodstock v. Town of Hancock, 62 Vt. 348, 19 Atl. 991 (1890).
At common law a penalty given by statute may be recovered either in I ssumpsit or
debt. Eubanks v. President, 36 Ill. 177 (1864).
But, if the statute prescribes the form of action for its recovery, the recovery can .be
had only in that form of action. Confrey v. Stark, 73 Ill. 187 (1874); Peabody V. Hoyt,
10 Mass. 36 (1813).
Assumpsit is the proper remedy under a statute (providing no other remedy) to
recover money paid for intoxicating liquors. Friend v. Dunks, 37 Mich. 25 (187-7'); Id.
39 Mich. 733 (1878).
266. For cases on the common counts, see the following: MeLeod v. Powe & Smith, 12
Ala. 9 (1847); Pike v. Zadig, .171 Cal. 273,'' 152-Pac. 923 (1915); Cory v. Board' of
Chosen Freeholders of SoMerset County, 47 N.J.L. 181 (1885); Pleading: Suf fipiency

1959]
IX.

ACTION

OF INDEBITATUS (GENERAL)

ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS:

(1)

ASSuIPSIT

55

STATEMENT OF AN EXECUTED

CONSIDERATION

Indebitatus Assumpsit
As we have stated previously, in stating the debt and its cause
in the common counts in Indebitatus Assumpsit, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, on a certain day, at a certain place, was
indebted for a sum certain, for a specific consideration furnished
by the plaintiff, with a statement that the consideration was fur267
nished at the special instance and request of the defendant
Time and place are in general immaterial, except that a time must
not be laid subsequent to the date when the cause of action
arose,268 and with regard to place, if the action is brought in a court
of inferior jurisdiction, the declaration should allege that the cause
of action arose within such jurisdiction. 60 The statement of the
sum claimed is also, generally, immaterial except that enough-must
be laid to cover the actual amount; Another requisite is the statement of the cause of the debt, as well as the debt iself; and this
is both for the information of the defendant, so that he may know
what debt is sued on and what defense to make, and in order to
identify the subject-matter of the action, so as to enable him to
plead the recovery in bar of any subsequent action for the samp
debt.270 As this form of action is founded upon contract, the cause
or consideration of the debt should be stated as having taken place
or as having been furnished at the special instance and request of
27 1
the defendant.
of the Common Counts, 4 Calif. L. Rev. 352 (1916). See also the extensive material
cited in Note 148.
On effect of general declarations, of which the common counts in assumpsit are the
most familiar, see Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 Harv. L. Rev.
169, 174-175 (1939).
267. Victors v. Davies, 12 M. & W. 758, 152 Eng. Rep. 1405 (1844).
A declaration in Indebitatus Assumpsit is good on general demurrer, though it
statesneither time, place, nor a request to pay. Keyser v. Shafer, 2 Cow. 437 (N. Y.
1823 ).
And consequently,* in those states where special demurrers are abolished, it would
seem that the allegation of some of these facts would be unnecessary, though it is certainly the better practice to allege them. McCrary v. Brown, 157 Ala. 50 So.. 402 (1909);
MeEwen v. Morey, 60 Ill.32 (1871).
268. Langer v. Parish, 8 Serg. & R. 134 (Pa. 1822).
269. This is in addition to the statement of-the county as a venue. Briggs v. President,
5 Mass. 96 (1809); Wetmore v. Baker, 9 Johns. 307 (N.Y. 1812); Thornton v. Smith,
1 Wash. 81 (Va. 1792).
270. Hibbert v. Courthope, Carth. 276, 9 Eng. Rep. 764 (1692).
It is not recessary however, to give a particular discription of the work done or
goods sold, etc. Edwards v. Nichols, 3 Day 16 4D. C. Conn. 1808); Crane v. Grassman,
27 Mich. 443' (1837); Lewis v. Culbertson, 11 Serg. & R. 49 (Pa. 1824).
271. McCrary v. Brown, 157 Ala. 518, 50 So. 402 (1909); Canfield v. Merrick, 11
Conn. 425, 429 (1836); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 185 Mass. 306, 70
N.E. 202 (1904). Compare Somerville v. Grim, 17 W.Va. 803, 810 (1881).
The statement that money was "lent" implies that it was advanced at the request of
the defendant. But this does not apply to monvey'"paid". Somerville v. Grim, 17 W. Va.
803, 810 (1881); Victor v. Davies, 12 M. & W. 758, 152 Eng. Rep. 1405. (1844). So
of count for goods sold and delivered. McEwen v. Morey, 60111. 32. (1871).
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Quantum Meruit and Quantum Valebant Counts
IN the Quantum Meruit count the plaintiff declares that, in consideration of his having performed some personal service for the
defendant, at his request, the latter promised to pay him so much
therefor as he reasonably deserved, and then states how much he
deserves for such service.27 '
In the Quantum Valebant count the plaintiff declares that, in
consideration of his having sold and delivered real or personal
property to the defendant at his request, he promised to pay him
so much as the goods or land were reasonably worth, and then
states what the value was. There is no necessity for using the
value or Quantum counts rather than the Indebitatus count for
27 3
what one's goods or services are reasonably worth.
In these counts it is not sufficient to state merely that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum, or promised
payment, but it must be shown what was the cause or subjectmatter or nature of the debt; as that it was for work done, or goods
sold, etc. 27 4 But it is not necessary to state the particular description of the work done, or goods sold, etc., for the only reasdn why
the plaintiff is bound to show in what respect the defendant is
indebted 27is that it may appear to the court that it is not a
specialty. 1
Account Stated
IT is usual, in an action of'General Assumpsit to add to the counts
above mentioned, a statement of a cause of action alleging that the
defendant accounted with the plaintiff, and that, upon such accounting, the defendant was found to be indebted to the plaintiff
in a certain sum. 2 76 As the consideration for the promise is here
272. Lawes, A Practical Treaties on Pleading in Assumpsit, c. XV, Of the Counts on
a Quantum Meruit, or Quantum Valebant, 509 (Ed. by Story, Boston 1811). Lee v.
Ashbrook, 14 Mo. 378 (1851); Pareell v. MeComber, 11 Neb. 209, 7 N.W. 520 (1880);
Wadeigh v. Town of Sutton, 6 N.H. 15 (1832).
273. Parker v. Macomber, 17 R. I. 674, 24 Atl. 464 (1892); Viles v. Barre & M.
Traction & Power Co., 79 Vt. 311, 65 At. 104 (1906).
Recovery of the reasonable value of goods sold or services rendered may be had
under an indebitatus count, so that neither a quantum meruit nor a quantum valebant

count is ever necessary. Norris v. School District No. 1, 12 Me. 293 (1835); Parker v.
McComber, 17 R.I. 674, 24 Atl. 464 (1892).
274. Maury v. Olive, 2 Stew. 472 (Ala. 1830); Beaucamp v. Bosworth, 3 Bibb. 115
(Ky. 1813); Chandler v. State, 5 Har. & J. 284 (Md. 1802); Rooke v. Rooke, Cro. Jac.
254, 79 Eng. Rep. 210 (1703).
275. Lewis'v. Culbertson, 11 Serg. & R. 49 (Pa. 1824); Story v. Atkins, 2 Ld Raym.
1429, 92 Eng. Rep. 428 (1726); Ambrose v. Roe, Skin. 217, 90 Eng. Rep. 100 (1684);
Hibbert v. Courthope, Carth. 276, 9 Eng. Rep. 764 (1692).
276. Stallings v. Gottschalk, 77 Md. 429, 26 Atl. 524 (1811); Knowles v. Michel, 13

East 249, 104 Eng. Rep. i366 (1811); Peacock v. Harris, 10 East 104, 102 Eng. Rep.
715 (1808); Trueman v. Hurst, 1 T.R. 42, 99 Eng. Rep. 1232 (1786),; Milward v.
Ingram, 2 Mod. 44, 86 Eng. Rep. 860 (1726).
Recovery on this count can be only when a certain and fixed sum is admitted to be
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the statement of the account ascertaining and fixing the sums due
which constitute the debt, and not the existence of the debt itself,
2 7
the original cause of the indebtedness need not be stated. 1
X. ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS: (2) THE PROMISE
is not intended by this that there must be a detailed statement of the defendant's contract, but a brief allegation that the
defendant "promised" or "agreed" to pay the sum owed or value
claimed. This much is held essential to a proper statement of the
cause of action, as the declaration might otherwise show the alleged consideration to be merely a voluntary or gratuitous act on
278
the part of the plaintiff, for which there could be no recovery.
It does not make any difference whether the defendant ever made
any such promise, nor is it necessary to prove it. All that is necessary to prove is a debt, and the law implies a promise. But some
279
courts will reverse a case on this technical matter.
IT

XI. ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS: (3) THE BREACH
neglect or refusal of the defendant to fulfill his promise,
whether express or implied, is always a necessary allegation in the
declaration, as it is essential to the plaintiff's right to sue. In form
it is usually a brief statement that the defendant has neglected
and refused to pay, and still neglects and refuses so to do. This is
the common breach usually assigned in actions upon the commoa
counts, and a separate breach is always assigned to each count,
as each is a separate and complete statement of a cause of action. 211
THE

XII. ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS: (4) THE DAMAGES
THE measure of recovery in this action will obviously be the
amount of the indebtedness due, or the reasonable worth and value
due. Richey v. Hathaway, 149 Pa. 207, 24 Al. 191 (1892); Warren v. Caryl, 61 Vt.
331, 17 At. 741 (1889).
277. Hoyt v. Wilkinson, 10 Pick. 31 (Mass. 1830); Montgomrie v. Ivers, 17 Johns.
38 (N.Y. 1819); Gilson v. Stewart, 7 Watts 100 (Pa. 1838); Cross v. Moore, 23 Vt.
482 (1851); Milward v. Ingram, 2 Mod. 44, 86 Eng. Rep. 860 (1726).
278. Cooper v. Landon, 102 Mass. 58 (1869); Kingsley v. Bill, 9 Mass. 199 (1811);
Muldrow v. Tappan, 6 Mo. 276 (1840); Booth v. Farmer's & Mechanic's Nat. Bank, I
Thomp. & C. 49 (N.Y. 1806); Candler v. Rossiter, 10 Wend. 487 (N.Y. 1833) But
see, Clark v. Reed, 12 Smedes & M. 554 (Miss. 1849).
The word "promised" is not necessary if an equivalent be used, as "undertook" or
"agreed". See Newport News v. Potter, 122 F. 321 (4th Cir. 1903); Wingo v. Brown,
12 Ricps. 279 (S.C. 1859); Shaw v. Redmond, 11 Serg. & R. 27 (Pa. 1824); Sexton v.
Holmes, 3 Munf. 566 (Va. 1809); Corbett v. Packington, 6 B. & C. 268, 108 Eng. Rep.
451 (1827).
279. Coffin '. Hall, 106 Me. 126, 75 Atl. 385 (1909); Danser v. Mallonee, 77 W.Va.
26, 86 S.E. 895 (1915); Bannister v. Victoria Coal &'Coke Co., 63 W.Va. 502, 61 S.E.
338 (1908); Waid v. Dixon, 55 W.Va. 191, 46 S.E. 918 (1904);
Contra, Wheeler v.
Wilson, 57 Vt. 157 (1884). But see, Potomac Laundry Co. v. Miller, 26 App. D. C.
230 (1905, rule of court).
280. Yong Dee. v. Hitchcock, 11 Hawaii 270 (1898); Taft v. Brewster, 9 Johns. 335
(N.Y. 1812); Holman v. Criswell, 13 Tex. 38 (1882).
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of the services rendered or goods or land sold, where no sum was
agreed upon; and the damages must always be laid high enough to
cover all the plaintiff expects to prove, as his recovery will be limit28
ed to the amount stated. '
XIII. STATUS UNrDER MODERN CODES, PRACTICE ACTS AND
RULES OF COURT

THE action of Indebitatus (General) Assumpsit was in general
use in the several states of the United States prior to 1848.22
After 1848, the action remained in vogue. Thus, for example, in the
Rhode Island case of Parker v. McComber,2 82 decided in 1892, in
which the plaintiff brought Indebitatus Assumpsit for goods sold
and delivered, work and labor, money had and received, and for
interest, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed damages at'$1,072.50, at a certain rate for 390 weeks, and the
defendant prayed for a new trial on the ground that the services
were performed under an entire contract, which had not been
completed, the court desired a new trial. In so doing, Douglas, J.
declared:
"The questions which are raised b the Petition are, whether the
plaintiff can recover what his services are reasonably worth, notwithstanding the making of the Contract, and, if so, whether this
Declaration is sufficient without a Count in Quantum Meruit to
admit evidence of the value of the services, and to sustain a Judgment therefor. We cannot doubt that, when this action was
brought, the agreement had been annulled, if it ever had had any
validity. If the leasehold interest were for a term exceeding one
year, the agreement amounted to an attempt to convey an interest
in real estate by parol, and was void under the Statute of Frauds.
In such case, as the defendant refused to continue the arrangement, whether justifiably or not, the plaintiff, is entitled to recover
the value of his services already rendered." Lockwood v. Barnes,
3 Hill, N. Y. 128; King v. Welcome, 5 Gray. 41.
"We think it is sufficient. A count in Quantum Meruit, as well
as one in Indebitatus Assumpst for work, labor, skill, care and diligence, etc., claims a certain sum as due. In either case the plain281. Liquidated damages for breach of special contract cannot be recovered under the
common counts. Butterfield v. Seligman, 17 Mich. 95 (1868).
Compare, Sprague v.
Morgan, 7 Ala. 952 (1845) (semble contra).
282. Angle v. Hanna, 22 Ill.429 (1859); Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. 285 (1827);
Peltier v. Sewall, 12 Wend. 386 (N.Y. 1834); Willson v. Forse, 6 Johns. 109 (N.Y.
1810);- Gillet v. Maynard, 5 Johns. 85 (N. Y. 109); Brooks v. Scott's Executor, 2 Munf.
344 (Va. 1811).
283; 17 R.I. 674, 24 Atl. 464 (1892).
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itiff may recover less, and the Judgment is for so much of his stated
claim as is found to be justly merited. The counts on Quantum
Meruit and in Quantum Valebant, are therefor unnecessary in any
case." 2 4 1 Chitty, On Pleading, 352, 353.
In the Illinois case of Angle v. Hanna,2- --decided in 1859, where
the plaintiff had agreed to work for four months at a certiin rate
per month, and subsequently quit work without comnleting performance of his contract, the only excuse being that the work was
too hard, it was held that an action of Indebitatus Assumpsit on a
Quantum Meruit count would not lie.
In New York case of City of New York v. Fink,28 decided in
1927, the issue was raised as to whether Indebitatus Assumpsit,
under the Code form of action on the Case, would lie against a
trespasser to land for the reasonable use and occupation thereof.
In denying a motion by the defendant, under Rule 112 of the
Rules of Civil Practice, for judgment on the pleadings, McGoldrick, J. said:
"As a Development of the Common Law a party was permitted
to bring an Action of Assumpsit, and thus avoid the difficulties presented in the Pleading and Proof of Causes of Action in Covenant,
Debt and the like. The remedy, however, was not extended to a
case in which the landlord sought to recover compensation for the
use of his land, not reserved by deed, until the enactment of statutes in subsiance re-enacted in our Bevised Statutes and contained
in Section 220 of our Real Property Law. When it is said, therefore, that to maintain Use and Occupation the conventional relation must exist, and such action caunot be maintained against a
trespasser, this merely means that the Form of Action characterized as Assumpsit and based upon the existence of the conventional relation of landlord and tenant could not be maintained
against one not bound expressly or impliedly as tenant, or against
a trespasser ...
"It would seem to follow that the historical reasons which prevented an owner of property from recovering Damages for trespass unless he had procured a Judgment against the wrongdoer no
longer exist, for the apparent object of the legislation was not that
compensation for trespass could only be had in an action to recover the property or the possession thereof, but to remedy a con.dition which made it necessary for a plaintiff in Ejectment to insti284. Parker v. McComber, 17 R. I. 674, 24 Adt. 464 (1892). Acord, Norris v. School
District in Winsor, 12 Me. 293 (1835).
285. 22 Ill.
429 (1859).
286. 130 Misc. 620, 224 N.Y. 404 (1927).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 35

tute, after Judgment, a separate proceeding for the collection of
his Damages."87
In view of the abolition of the forms of actions by the Codes, an
issue was bound to arise as to whether the summary method of
statement of a cause of action, as found in the action of General
Assumpsit, could be used under the Codes. Dean Pomeroy held to
the position that in the face of the Code requirement that the complaint should state the facts in plain and concise language, the
practice of using the common counts in Indebitatus Assumpsit
violated one of the fundamental objectives of the Codes.288 "But"
said Judge Clark, "the Common Counts were apparently too well
and favorably known and too convenient a form of pleading to
succumb to this strenuous attack, for in probably all Jurisdictions
the use of the Common Counts, at least for an indebtedness incur289
red with the defendant's consent, is well settled."
Judge Clark's view finds confirmation in the New York case of
Maxherman Co., Inc. v. Alper,290 decided in 1924. The complaint,
which was in the form of a common count in Indebitatus Assumpsit, sought to recover the value of goods alleged to have been sold
to the defendants at their special instance and request, was held
sufficient on motion by the defendant for judgment on the pleadings, even though a bill of particulars showed that the defendant
had secured the goods from third persons on an alleged purchase,
but with knowledge of the facts. Said the Court:
"While it seems to me that every Complaint should state facts
giving rise to a Cause of Action, complaints in the Common-Law
Form have been sustained since the enactment of the Civil Practice
Act. Such being the case, I cannot distinguish the Complaint in
the case at Bar, supported as it is by the Bill of Particulars, from
the Complaints in numerous other adjudicated cases."91
Finally, in the Federal case of Stone v. White,2 2 decided in 1937,
in which the plaintiff brought a statutory action for a refund of
taxes erroneously collected the Supreme Court of the United States
sustained the plaintiff, Mr. Justice Stone observing:
"The action, brought to recover a tax erroneously paid, although
an Action at Law, is Equitable in its function. It is the lineal suc287. City of New York v. Fink, 130 Misc. 620, 621, 224 N.Y. Supp 404, 406 (1927).
288. Pomeroy, Code Remedies, § 436, Common Counts Under the Codes, 669 (5th ed.
by Carrington, Boston 1929).
289. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleadings, c. V, The Complaint, § 46,. The
Common Counts, 290 (2d ed. St. Paul. 1947).
290. 210 App. Div. 389 (1924).
291. Maxherman Co. v. Alper, 210 App. Div. 389, 392 (1924).
392. 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937).
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cessor of the Common Count in Indebitatus Assumpsit for Money
Had and Received. Originally an action for the recovery of Debt,
favored because more convenient and flexible than the Common
Law Action of Debt, it has been gradually expanded as a medium
for recovery upon every Form of Quasi-Contractual Obligation in
which the duty to pay money is Imposed by Law, independently
of Contract, Express or Implied in fact."293
It thus appears that the common-law action of Indebitatus (General) Assumpsit is still operating at the old stand, with is earlier
vitality substantially unimpaired, despite our modern codes, practice acts and rules of court.

293. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937).
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